

A
Comparative Study
OF THE
Indian Science of Thought
FROM
The Jaina Standpoint.

HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA M.A., B.L.

Konnagar (Dt. Hugly).

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BY
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Published by
C. S. MALLINATH
FOR
The Devendra Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd.

MADRAS.

1925

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1. Jnana.

PHILOSOPHY, as conceived in India, was not a system of dry rationalism or of impatient positivism, but was always a system of rationalistic positivism or of positivistic rationalism. Man was conceived as a being in bondage and the world, an abode of misery and pain ; each of the philosophical systems of India started with the problem of Final Emancipation. All the rationalism of the systems of Indian philosophy is thus permeated and animated by the never-forgotten practical aim,—How to emancipate Man.

While this rationalistic positivism is the distinguishing feature of all the systems of Indian philosophy the difference between the orthodox and the non-orthodox systems is also worthy of note. And here again we may at once say that the difference lies in the increased emphasis which the non-orthodox systems lay on the practical aspect of the aforesaid practical aim of Indian philosophy. The orthodox systems of Indian philosophy hold that the Final Emancipation is attainable only through True Knowledge. They all seem to ignore the direct efficacy or utility of Practices and like the philosophy of Aristotle extol the contemplative life. Practice in these systems is subordinated to knowledge and is really made a way to it. This will be apparent from even a cursory study of the 4th Pada of the 3rd Chapter of the Brahma Sutras. The Sankhya, the Nyaya and the Vaisheshika Schools of philosophy, all held that Salvation is attainable only through True Knowledge. (Vide Sankhya-Sutras, 21-24 Vairagya-Chapter, Nyaya-Sutra, 1. 1. 1 and Vaisheshika-Sutra 1. 1. 4.)

Far other, however, is the doctrine of Salvation in the non-orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. While admitting the instrumentality of Knowledge to bring about the Bliss, they lay a great deal of emphasis on the efficacy of Practice. The very first doctrine which

Buddha is said to have preached to his five disciples were the Four Truths viz., of Suffering, the Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering and the Way to the Cessation of Suffering. This last Truth is explained in this way :—

" This, O Bhikkhus, is the noble Truth of the Way leading to the Annihilation of Suffering. That blessed Eight-fold Path is as follows— Right Faith, Right Aspiration, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Means of Livelihood, Right Exertion, Right Tendency of the Mind, Right Meditation." (Mahavagga, I., 6.)

These are the eight ways to the Nirvana. Who will fail to see that according to these principles of Buddhism, Practice is as essential to the attainment of Nirvana as Knowledge ?

Hardly less prominent is the practical tone of Jainism. In reference to the Way of the Final Emancipation, Vadi-deva Suri distinctly says,—

" The Emancipation of the Self which has acquired a male or female body, consists in the annihilation of all the Karmas through Right Knowledge and Conduct."

7. 57—*Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara*

Thus while Right Conduct occupies a secondary place in the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, in

Jainism it is as much essential to the attainment of Moksha as Right Knowledge.

From this practical tendency of the Jaina philosophy, we think, its doctrines of the Syadvada and of the Naya originated. The Pramanas give us the nature of things ; but a practical man is not satisfied with this Knowledge only. He wants to know not simply what a thing is in and to itself but what it is or what it would be in connection with other things. A thing cannot be considered as absolutely self-centred ; nor can it be thought of as a sum-total of extraneous relations. It is both itself and not itself. Hence a careful study of both these complementary aspects of a thing can give us a full knowledge of the thing. It is the distinctive characteristic of the Jaina philosophy to describe knowledge to be of two forms viz., the Pramana (the Knowledge of a thing as it is in and to itself) and the Naya (the Knowledge of a thing in its limitations, relations and modifications.)

Coming to the nature of True Knowledge, the Jaina philosophers e.g., Vadi-deva Suri maintain,—

“The Validity of Knowledge consists in its agreement with the Object.”

The True or Valid Knowledge is thus opposed to False Knowledge or Samaropa, consisting in “taking a thing for what it is not.” Samaropa is essentially similar to Avidya as it is conceived in 5, Sadhanapada of the

Yoga-Sutras. Sankara Misra, the Vaiseshika scholar, described Samsaya, Biparyaya, Svapna and Anadhyavasaya as the four modes of Avidya or false knowledge. The Jaina philosophers refuse to regard Svapna or Dream as a form of false knowledge and hold that Samaropa is of three modes only viz, Biparyaya Samsaya and Anadhyavasaya.

(a) *Biparyaya* "is a false idea of a thing owing to our attending to one aspect of it only." The example is,—we often take an oyster-shell for a piece of silver. The cause of this form of false knowledge is that we fail to consider at the time the characteristics which distinguish a shell from silver and fix upon whiteness which quality the shell has in common with a piece of silver.

The philosophers of the school of Prabhakara refuse to look upon Biparyaya as a form of false Knowledge. According to them, the Illusion,—'this is Silver'—contains an element of Perception ('this') and an element of Recollection ('Silver'),—the correctness of none of which can be challenged. Hence, Biparyaya or the psychosis 'This is silver' is not a case of false knowledge but a case of 'Bhedakhyati' i.e., failure to distinguish two distinct mental elements and our proneness to mix up the elements of Perception and Recollection in one single psychosis. The Jaina

philosophers contend that Biparyaya is certainly a form of false Knowledge in as much as according to the admission of Prabhakara-thinkers themselves, the matter of Biparyaya does not correspond with reality.

(b) *Samsaya* is thus defined by Vadi-deva : "When the phenomenon presented before us touches the aspects of many things and we cannot properly examine these aspects owing to our not having at the time the relevant and the non-relevant Pramanas, the state of mind that results is *Samsaya* (dubitation)." The example of *Samsaya*, given by Kanada and Gautama are substantially similar to the Jaina definition. (Vide *Vaisesika-Sutra* 2. 2. 17 and *Nyaya Sutra* 1. 1. 23). Dubitation arises when a mark common to two or many phenomena is seen and the mark, distinguishing each individual is not observed or determined.

(c) *Anadhyavasaya* is the third form of *Samaropa* and consists in Inattention. When a man going through a way happens to tread upon a blade of grass while going on and asks within himself 'What is it?'—his mental state may be said to be *Anadhyavasaya*. Ratnaprabhacharyya, the Jaina commentator, however, contends that strictly speaking, *Anadhyavasaya* cannot be called *Samaropa* because it does not yield positively false knowledge. But as *Anadhyavasaya* does neither yield positively valid knowledge, it is

looked upon as a mode of Samaropa by the Jaina thinkers.

So much about the formal aspect of the Jaina theory of valid knowledge. We shall now consider shortly the matter or the objects of valid knowledge,—the question, what are the objects known or knowable?

According to the Jaina philosophers, the Self and the Non-self are the two objects knowable. The great Buddhistic and the Vedantic systems of philosophy are well known for nihilism or denial of External Reality. The question raised by the Buddhists is mainly this : "What is a Thing (the so-called External Reality or the Non-self)? Is it an Atom or a Thing of greater magnitude or both an Atom and a Gross Thing or neither an Atom nor a Gross Thing? We meet with difficulties whatever view we may adopt." The Jainas meet the Buddhist objections by appealing to their "Doctrine of Standpoints." They point out that the Buddhist metaphysics is based on unreasonable abstractions, Reality is not an Atom nor is it Gross. It is both Atomic and Gross. In its substantial aspect, a thing may be said to be atomic; from the standpoint of its modifications it may be looked upon as gross.

The Vedantic school of philosophy also raises an objection to the reality of the Non-self. According to

it, External Reality is not,—only the one and the Secondless Brahman is. The Jainas criticise the extreme monistic position, urging that the doctrine of the Vedanta is opposed to direct perception as well as to inference.

Thus the Jaina philosophers establish the truth—that there is External Reality and that it is knowable.

The other object of valid knowledge according to the Jainas is the Self, Soul or Knowledge itself. This is opposed to the theory of the great Mimamsaka School of Bhatta, according to whom Extraspection or observation of things outside the Self is the only function of the Self and that, in other words, the Self which knows all things cannot know itself. The argument of the Mimamsaka philosophers is similar to that of Mansel, Spencer and Comte, against the possibility of direct Introspection. "The thinker cannot divide himself into two," says Comte, "of whom one reasons whilst the other observes him reason. The organ observed and the organ observing, being in this case identical, how could observation take place?" The philosophers of the Yauga (Nyaya) school, on the other hand, contend that the Self cannot be directly observed; but that through reflection and retrospection, it can be observed indirectly. This Nyaya position is not dissimilar to the doctrine of J. S. Mill who, answering to Comte, says,

"It might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact may be studied through memory not at the very moment of our perceiving it but the moment after; and this is really the way in which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. We reflect on what we have been doing when the act is past but when its impression in the memory is still fresh."

Against all these agnostic and semi-agnostic theories, the Jainas maintain that the Self is directly knowable. The beautiful argument of Vadi-deva is,—“Admitting that the Outside as the Object of Knowledge can be clearly known, who will not admit that like Light, Knowledge itself is self-revealing also?” This, we think, is a complete answer to the agnosticism of Prabhakara, Kant, Spencer, Mill, Comte and of the Nyaya School. The Self is knowable and that, directly. It is self-revealing or ‘Svayamprakasa,’ as the Vedanta maintains.

The net conclusion of the Jaina philosophy is that the Self and the Non-self can both be the objects of valid knowledge.

We have already pointed out that according to the Jainas, Jnana or Valid Knowledge is either Pramana or Vaya. Let us study Pramana first.

2. Pramana.

Roughly speaking, every system of philosophy claims to give true knowledge as distinguished from Illusion, Doubt and Inattention which we have in our ordinary life. This true knowledge is called Pramana, in Indian philosophy. The ways or means of attaining it are also called the Pramanas. We have seen that the Jaina thinkers describe Pramana as—"the certain knowledge regarding the Self and the Non-self." They contend that this definition of the Pramana does not tally with the one given by the Mimansakas which is as follows :—

"Pramana. makes to us known what was unknown." The Jaina philosophers urge that the Mimansaka definition of the Pramana excludes Smriti or Recollection from its scope; for Recollection gives us knowledge not of an entirely new thing but, as is well known, of a thing previously perceived or otherwise cognised. It is to be noted that not only the Mimansakas but the thinkers of all the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy refuse to recognise Smarana as a special mode of the Pramana. The Jainas on the contrary, for reasons to be discussed latter on, admit Recollection as one of the sources of Valid Knowledge.

A lively debate seems to have been indulged in, in ancient India, regarding the number of the Pramanas.

On this point, not only do the orthodox schools differ from the non-orthodox schools of philosophy but there are differences of opinions among the orthodox systems themselves. Each philosophy has its own group of *Pramanas* and vehemently protests against the assumption by any other philosophy of more or less sources of Knowledge.

We may begin with the iconoclastic system of the Charvakas. Ridiculous as the position may appear, these sophists are bold in their affirmation that the *Pratyaksha* or the sensuous knowledge is the only valid knowledge that we can have. All forms of indirect knowledge including the *Anumana* or inference are uncertain and unreliable, if not entirely invalid. Opposed to this notorious view of the Charvakas, was the position of some of the Indian thinkers who admitted no less than 8 or 9 kinds of the *Pramana*. These are,—

(1) 'Pratyaksha' or Sensuous Perception. (2) 'Anumana' or Inference. We infer the existence of Fire in the Hill from the existence of Smoke there. (3) 'Sabda' or Verbal Knowledge. A fact, for example is admissible because it is so written in the Scriptures. (4) 'Upamana' or Analogy. We guess about 'Gabaya' (a quadruped similar to a Cow in appearance) by observing in it some characteristics,

similar to those in a Cow. (5) 'Arthapatti' or Inference through the Method of Residue. It is given that Devadatta is a fat person ; it is also given that he does not eat anything during the day ; through Arthapatti, we conclude that he takes meals at night. (6) 'Abhava' or Knowledge of non-existence. Direct perception gives us that there is a vacant piece of land before us ; it is through Abhava-Pramana that we know that a pitcher does not exist before us. (7) 'Sambhava' or the Knowledge of parts from the knowledge of the whole and vice versa. The stock example is : Khari (a measure of higher standard) includes Drona (a measure of lower standard), (8) 'Aitihya' or Hearsay Knowledge. This gives us such informations as 'a Demon lives in a certain tree' etc. (9) 'Pratibha' or Mysterious Apprehension. A certain poor man one morning suddenly feels that he would be a favourite of the Emperor that very day.

It appears that if the Charvakas excluded a good many sources of valid knowledge, these orthodox thinkers did unsystematically include within the category of the Pramanas psychoses which are not always the sources of valid knowledge. For, it is well known that we cannot in most cases safely rely on 'Aitihya' and 'Pratibha,' hearsay evidence and personal apprehensions. Where these are reliable, they are based on

either 'Pratyaksha' or 'Anumana.' 'Sambhava' again, is clearly a form of inference. A Jaina commentator points out: '*Khari* includes or consists of Drona; *because it is Khari*;' the italicised words indicate the Hetu of the implied inference which because of its immediacy is not consciously cognised. Hence the great Mimamsaka scholar Bhatta and the Vedantins refuse to admit 'Sambhava', 'Aitihya' and 'Pratibha' as special sources of valid knowledge and regard 'Pratyaksha' 'Anumana' 'Sabda', 'Upamana', 'Arthapatti' and 'Abhava'—these six only as the Pramanas. Prabhakara, another illustrious scholar of the Mimamsaka school, rejected, however, the claim of 'Abhava' as a separate source of knowledge and maintained that the Pramanas are five in number. The Nyaya schools, on the contrary, contend that, "Pratyaksha, Anumana, Upamana and Sabda are the sources of Knowledge." (Nyaya-Sutra, 1. 1. 3). 'Abhava,' the Nyaya thinkers urge, is a mode of Pratyaksha. 'Arthapatti' also is not a separate source of Knowledge; as the author of Bhasha-Parichchheda says, "Arthapatti is not a separate source of knowledge; it is accomplished through the recognition of a 'Vyatireka-Vyapti' or negative relationship between the Mark and the Proven." As regards the Sankhya position reference may be made to Aphorism, 86.

Vishayadhyaya of the Sankhya-Sutras." The Pramana is of three kinds; all objects being capable of being determined through these three, others cannot be entertained." Kapila leaves out of account 'Upamana' or Analogy, recognised by the Nyaya schools and holds that 'Pratyaksha,' 'Anumana' and 'Agama' are the three sources of valid knowledge. He is followed not only by the Yoga school of Patanjali but by a particular class of Nyaya thinkers themselves. The Vaiseshika thinkers decrease the number of the Pramanas still further and maintain that 'Pratyaksha' and Anumana are the two only sources of Knowledge. 'Sabda' or 'Agama' is included by them in 'Anumana' on the ground that meanings of words or sentences must be understood before they would give us knowledge and that the understanding of meanings depends upon the recognition of a 'Vyapti.' According to the Buddhist thinkers also, 'Pratyaksha' and 'Anumana' are the only sources of valid cognition.

The Jaina philosophy also has its own recognised sources of Knowledge. These are two in number,— 'Pratyaksha' or Direct Knowledge or Perception and 'Paroksha' or Indirect Knowledge or Ideation. The Jaina division of the Pramanas is obviously dichotomic and is entitled to all the credit on that account. The difference between the 'Pratyaksha' and the

'Paroksha' is stated to be one of degree only. Vadi-deva says :—"The Pramana is of two kinds—Direct and Indirect" (1) "The Direct one is clear" (2) "Clearness consists in revealing the particular aspects of things (under observation) in a greater degree than what is done by Inference etc." (3)—Second Chapter. "Indirect Knowledge is not so clear" (1)—Third Chapter. *Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara*.

It comes to this then that according to the Jaina, an idea is nothing but a fainter form of a Percept. This Perceptual theory of Ideation, if we be permitted to call it so, has had illustrious supporters in the history of European psychology also. The older writers, as a rule, use Perception as a synonym for cognition in general. Locke does not only call Perception an Idea but he himself has no objection to identify 'thinking' with Perception. Hobbes also defines Imagination (by which he means Ideation) as "—nothing but decaying sense." He is followed by Hume who regards memory and imagination as "the faculty by which we repeat our impressions." Wundt also applies the term 'Vorstellung' both to Perception and to Idea. The identification of Ideation with Perception is almost complete and unambiguous in Titchener when he says,—"Perceptions and Ideas are both alike, groups of sensations."

From the above, it should not be inferred, however, that the Jaina psychologists are all sensationists like Hume who would see in all psychoses nothing but sensations and sensuous percepts. It will be shown hereafter how the Jainas recognise in Ideational consciousness, a peculiar element or ingredient which distinguishes it from all sensuous processes.

Pramana, according to the Jainas, is either Pratyaksha or Paroksha. Let us study the nature of the Pratyaksha in the next section.

3. Pratyaksha Pramana.

Pratyaksha Pramana is what we understand by Perception or Perceptual cognition, although we shall see that the Indian thinkers include within the category of Pratyaksha some supersensuous psychoses which modern psychology would not bring under Perception. Gautama defines Pratyaksha as "..... certain knowledge arising from the fact of proximity of the senses to their objects." In 87, Vishayadhyaya of the Sankhya-Sutra, Kapila describes it as "knowledge consisting in an exact idea of a thing to which the human sense-organ is applied." As to the genesis of Pratyaksha, Bhoja also says that it arises "when the mind comes in contact with an external object through

the sense-organs." It thus appears that Pratyaksha according to the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy is knowledge due to the proximity of the senses to their objects. The theory of Perception, as developed by the early Greek thinkers is essentially similar to the orthodox Indian theory. According to Empedocles, Perception is due to the sense-organs receiving the continual " effluxes " rising from the bodies around us. Democritus maintained that from every object ' eidola ' (or images) of the object are continually being given off which enter the organs of sense and give rise to our sensations. Epicurus also explains Perception by supposing a direct contact of image and organ.

The Jaina philosophers, however, refuse to admit this Proximity or contact theory of Perception. They contend that Pratyaksha as a species of cognition cannot be equivalent to or at least a product of a mechanical contact of a sense-organ and an object both of which are admittedly gross material masses. The theories of Perception discussed above are essentially materialistic,—attempting as they do, to explain psychosis by physiosis. Accordingly, the Jainas choose to describe the process of Perception not as an interaction between the outside objects and the sense-organs but as a peculiar mode of the Soul being freed or relieved. Perception or Pratyaksha according to them,

like all other psychical phenomena, develops from within the Soul when its perception-obscuring hindrances subside or are mitigated. It must be admitted that from the metaphysical standpoint, the Jaina theory of Perception can claim much plausibility. It avoids the absurdity of psychological materialism by clearly and emphatically holding that Pratyaksha is a psychical and not a physical phenomenon.

The next question that arises is, What is Pratyaksha?—or more properly, How much is Pratyaksha?

The philosophers of the Buddhist school come in with their famous doctrine of the Nirvikalpa. The celebrated thinker, Dignaga says,—“The Pratyaksha is the psychosis which is free from all sorts of determination and from mistakes.” It is akin to what is called Pure Sensation in modern psychology. Such a psychosis consists just in the first result of the contact of the mind with the object outside. We see Something; the very first form of consciousness,—the *Primum Cognitum*,—which is wrought and generated in our mind by the Something, immediately after we come across it and even before we attend to it, assimilate it to and differentiate it from the pre-existing mass of consciousness, classify and name it, is Pratyaksha according to the Buddhistic thinkers. The

Jaina philosophers, however, reject the Buddhist theory of the Pratyaksha and deny that there can be any Nirvikalpa or undetermined Perception at all. The sensuous perception that we have do not show that there is any perception which is absolutely undetermined. The mental or internal perceptions also cannot enable us to understand or feel Nirvikalpa for the simple reason that nothing can be a matter for internal perception which was not previously a matter for sensuous perception. Immediate self-consciousness also shows that perception is always Savikalpa ; for immediately after we have a sensation,— nay, along with it—we have the consciousness of the object which causes that sensation or of the subject which has it. Hence the Jaina conclusion is that there cannot be any such thing as Nirvikalpa or Pure Sensation. The Jaina theory reminds us of the famous theory of Herbart viz., that of Apperception, according to which a matter of consciousness is not like an atom separated from other atoms but is a compounding and assimilating unity, losing itself in the pre-existing psychical mass.

Some of the Mimamsaka psychologists also seem to agree with the Jaina thinkers in their theory of perception. All perception is determined by generalisation and a pure sensation is an impossibility.

Bhartrihari, for example, says,—“ There is no perception which is possible without naming (*i.e.*, determination by processes of generalisation etc.). All knowledge is indissolubly mixed up with naming.”

The psychologists of the Sankhya school, on the other hand include within Pratyaksha both Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa,—determined perception and pure sensation. This will be apparent from a study of Aniruddha Bhatta's commentary on 87, Vishayadhyaya of the Sankhya-Sutras. The Vaisheshika school also admit the validity of both Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa. Sankara Misra distinctly says—“ Limited Pratyaksha (as opposed to omniscience) is of two sorts viz., the Savikalpa and the Nirvikalpa.” As regards the theory of the Nyaya school, Vachaspati Misra says that the words, ‘*Apyapadesya*’ and ‘*Vyavasayatmakā*’ which occur in Gautama's definition of Pratyaksha refer respectively to the Nirvikalpa and the Savikalpa modes of perception.

Now, this Pratyaksha has been subdivided by the Jaina philosophers into Samvyavaharika or Practical or Ordinary Perception and Paramarthika or Transcendental or Occult Perception, which two modes are considered in the next two sections.

4. Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha Pramana.

The Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha Pramana or the ordinary direct cognition is stated by the Jaina psychologists to be developed through four psychical processes viz., 1. Avagraha or Grasp. 2. Iha or Attention. 3. Avaya or Determination and 4. Dharana or Retention. These may be described as follows.

1. Avagraha : When an object acts upon our mind, the very first form of consciousness that arises is that Something is existing outside our mind. What follows is that we determine that that Something is of such and such a class viz., a Man or a Beast etc. This second stage is the stage of Avagraha.
2. Iha : After a thing is Grasped, the next psychosis is Iha or Attention. It consists in—"a desire to determine the particular aspects of a thing Grasped."
3. Avaya : This is the result of Attention consisting in—"a determination of the particular aspects attended to."
4. Dharana : The fourth or last stage in Perception is Retention. "Dharana is that (Avaya or Determination) attaining a firm state."

Much credit is undoubtedly due to the Jaina psychologists for pointing out that Perception, although to all intents and purposes a simple psychosis is a complex process when psychologically analysed. The

modern psychologists of Europe admit this important truth and their account of perception is not essentially different from what the Jainas give of it.

Ordinary Direct Knowledge is of two sorts viz., of the Sensuous kind (Indriya-nibandhana) and of the Non-sensuous kind (Anindriya-nibandhana). It is admitted of course that the instrumentality of the Mind (Anindriya) is a common condition of Sensuous and Non-sensuous perceptions. But while the latter is due solely to the mental activity, the former is caused by the instrumentality of the senses in addition to the mental activity. Hence Perception is said to be of two kinds.

Sensuous Perception is perception due to the instrumentality of the Senses. But the question is,—What is the nature of a sense-organ that it may cause perception? The philosophers of the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika schools consider the senses to be of a grossly material nature (vide Nyaya Sutra 1. 1. 12 and the Vaiseshika Sutra 8. 2. 5. and especially the commentary of Sankara Misra on the latter). But such a conception of the nature of sense-organs leads to the difficulties of a psychological materialism, already observed. Accordingly the Sankhya school tries to give a better account of the senses. These as indicated in 23, Pradhana-karyadhyaya of the Sankhya-Sutras are not

gross but are really supersensuous. In 84, Parapaksha-nirjayadhyaya Kapila distinctly says that the senses are not grossly material in their nature but are modifications of the supersensuous principle of Ahamkara. The Sankhya theory of perception is that it is not the result of Gross Matter coming in contact with Gross Matter (as according to the Nyaya and the Vaisesika theories,) but is the result of a peculiar supersensuous tendency coming in contact with Gross Matter. It is doubtful, however, if even this theory is quite satisfactory. It is well known that the Sankhya philosophers refuse to attribute any psychical element to the senses. Without the psychical element, the senses would remain material in their nature and would be unable to generate the psychical phenomena of preception in us,—no matter, however fine and supersensuous their elements may be. Hence the Jaina philosophers give a different account of the Senses which is as follows. In senses, they recognise firstly, the Dravyendria or material senses or sense-organs and Bhavendria or subjective senses or sense faculties. In Bhavendria again, two elements are recognised viz., Labdhi or tendency towards the sensed object and Upayoga or attention on the part of the Soul. The Jains maintain that as soon as the object of perception comes in contact with the material sense-organ

(Dravyendria), the sense-faculty (Bhavendriya) is drawn towards it (Labdhi) and attention (Upayoga) is bestowed on it. Perception is a psychical process and results only when its (material) object is thus fully distilled and purged of its grossly material nature.

It is thus that the Jainas escape the difficulties of the Contact theory of Perception,—difficulties arising from a materialistic account of the senses. It remains only to be said that according to them the Senses excepting the Eye are Prapyakari i.e., generate perception by actually coming in contact with the objects. This view is opposed firstly to the doctrine of the orthodox thinkers according to whom all the senses are Prapyakari and secondly to that of the Buddhists who contend that not only the Eye but the Ear also is not Prapyakari.

The next class of Ordinary Perception is Anindriyanibandhana,—the Internal or Mental Perception. These consist in purely subjective feelings of pleasure, pain etc. They are independent of the outside objects and of the activity of the sense-organs and are due solely to the mind, the internal organ.

As for the nature of Mind, it is well known that in Europe, Mind is ordinarily identified with the Soul or where a distinction is sought to be made between them, it is taken to stand for the sumtotal of conscious states.

In 3. 1. 16–17 of the Nyaya Sutas, Gautama, however, distinguishes the Mind from the Soul. The Manas or Mind, according to him, is a real entity that prevents the simultaneous geneses of more than one piece of knowledge. The mental phenomena in other words are so determined by the Manas that they must come one after another. (Vide Nyaya Sutra 1. 1. 16). The Vaiseshika theory of the Manas is exactly the same. (Vide Vaiseshika Sutas 3. 2. 1–3). The Mind is thus a reality according to the Indian thinkers in as much as it is the Inner Sense. Secondly, it is atomic in nature ("Centre of communication," as Spencer says) and not pervasive. The Sankhya theory of the Manas is not essentially different from the Vaiseshika one, although at places (e.g. in 71, Parapakshanirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutas), Kapila holds that the mind is not atomic but pervasive in nature.

It may be said that the description of the Mind as given above is not complete. Vatsayana, the Nyaya commentator explained the process of perception by saying, "The Soul is joined to the Mind, the Mind to the Sense-organ, the Sense-organ to the Object." But the question is : How can the Mind be joined to the Soul on the one hand and to the Sense-organ (Matter) on the other? This explanation is found in the Jaina theory of the Manas. According to it, the

Manas has two parts or aspects viz., the Dravya-Manas and the Bhava-Manas. The Dravya-Manas or material mind is composed of a kind of extremely fine Matter called the Mano-vargana. Through the channel of the Dravya-Manas the gross matters of sense come up before the Soul when the Bhava-Manas through Labdhi and Upayoga attend to and assimilate it. The Mind thus makes perception possible by drawing Matter towards the Soul and drawing the Soul towards Matter. And it is capable of doing these because it partakes of the nature of both Soul and Matter.

5. Paramarthika Pratyaksha Pramana.

Indian philosophers admitted the possibility of a supernatural way of perceiving things. Reference to such transcendental perception is made in 88, 89 Vishayadhyaya, Sankhya Sutras and in 11, 14 and 15 of the Second Section of the 9th Chapter of the Vaisesika Sutras. The present day theosophists and occultists of Europe not only regard such perceptions as possible but they attach importance and truth of supreme worth to their matter, although the positivist scientists as a rule regard clairvoyance and other phenomena of the Seance-Room as nothing but sheer impostures. According to the Jainas, "the Trans-

cendental Perception.....is dependent solely on the Soul as regards its origin (Vadi-deva)." It is either Incomplete or Complete. Incomplete Transcendental Perception again is either Avadhi-jnana or Manah-paryaya-jnana.

"The Avadhi-jnana is knowledge which arises when what envelopes it subsides in a peculiar way,—which is connate in some and in others, acquired by means of rightness and which has for its objects things having form." It seems that Patanjali had in view Avadhi-jnana when he says,—“When that Illuminating Principle is directed to them, the minute (e.g., the atoms); the intervened and the distant are known (26, Bibhuti-pada, Yoga-sutras).” It is clairvoyance which is described by Mr. Jastrow (Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology) as “the alleged ability by use of a peculiar faculty to see things not normally visible at all or things at a great distance.” According to Kundakundacharyya, “Avadhi is of three kinds,—Desavadhi, Paramavadhi and Sarvavadhi.” The Desavadhi is Avadhi-jnana regarding only a limited number of things. The Paramavadhi is a higher faculty by means of which an indefinite number of supersensuous perceptions can be had. The Sarvavadhi is the highest form of Avadhi-jnana by which all the supersensuous aspects of all the things

of the universe can be perceived. The object of Avadhi-jnana is the supersensuous aspects of material things. Thus Darkness and Shade among others may be the objects of Avadhi-jnana ; for in opposition to the theory of the Nyaya and the Vaisesika schools, the Jainas maintain, these are not unsubstantial non-existences but are substances having form (Rupī-Dravyas). Among the conscious beings, there are some in whom the first form of the Avadhi-jnana is connate. These are the denizens of the heaven and the hell. Man, however, can attain the power of Clairvoyance by means of good practices.

"Manah-paryaya-jnana has for its object the particular aspects of the substance (others') Mind and arises when what envelopes it subsides in a peculiar way because of Restraint and Purity (in conduct, practised by the knower)." Manah-paryaya-jnana, as conceived by the Jainas is similar to Telepathy and Mind-reading of modern European occultists. Patanjali refers to what the Jainas call Manah-paryaya-jnana in 19 and 20 of Bibhuti-pada of the Yoga-sutras. In 35, of the same chapter, he expressly says, "Knowledge of Minds is attained when the Concentrative Attention is directed to the innermost heart." Manah-paryaya-jnana is of two modes viz., Rijumati and Vipulamati. Both the temporal and the spatial limits of Rijumati are smaller than those of Vipulamati.

These are the two forms of Incomplete Transcendental Knowledge. It would be seen that Manah-paryaya-jnana differs from Avadhi-jnana in important points. The object of the former is always immaterial substance. The second point of difference is that while Avadhi-jnana may be connate in some beings, Manah-paryaya-jnana is always a faculty, acquired through penances etc.

The Complete Transcendental Knowledge is Omniscience and is variously called Sakala-jnana and Kevala-jnana by the Jaina. According to Vadi-deva, "Complete Knowledge is Pure Knowledge, meaning the Knowledge of all things with all their modes or manifestations." The possibility of such Knowledge is admitted in Sūtras 34, 50 and 55, Bibhuti-pada of the Yoga-Sūtras, in 12, of the 1st. Section of the 9th Chapter of the Vaiseshika Sūtras. It is interesting to observe that the modern occultists of Europe admit the possibility of a sort of omniscience. "The very last, most elevated and glorious of the objective lives having completed," says Mr. A. P. Sinnett in his "Esoteric Buddhism," "the perfected spiritual being reaches a condition in which a complete recollection of all lives lived at any time in the past return to him."

It is Mimamsaka system of philosophy that rejects the theory of omniscience. The Jainas criticise their

view which is essentially an atheistic and Godless position and call the All-knowing,—Arhat, God, the Paramatman. We may here omit the consideration of the point of difference in the theories of Arhat advanced by the Digambara and the Svetambara Jainas, according to the former of whom, Arhat is under no necessity of taking meals while according to the latter there is no inconsistency if He eats food.

The Sankhya theory of Isvara, as developed in 54 and 55 of the Vairagyaadhyaya of the Sankhya-Sutras is identical with the Jaina doctrine of God. According to both, God is simply the Muktatma, the liberated Soul, as Kapila calls him (Vide 90, Vishayadhyaya). The Jainas would not agree, however, with the Yoga theory of God, who, according to Patanjali is the presiding Soul over the Liberated Souls, although the Jainas like the Yogins attribute infinite and absolute perfection to God. The Vedanta theory of "the one and the second-less" Brahman is rejected by the Jaina thinkers, although they would agree with the Vedantists in their doctrine of the Liberated Soul to some extent. Lastly, the Jaina theory of God is opposed to the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika doctrines, according to which God is not only the Omniscient Being but the Demiurgus or the Architect of the Universe.

6. Paroksha Pramana.

2. We saw how the Jaina logicians divided the Pramanas into two classes viz., Pratyaksha and Paroksha. In the preceding sections we have dealt the various modes of the Pratyaksha. We have seen how our sensuous apprehension of things begins with Grasp; how after this first flash, we want to know the details; how we consequently come to determine the object of our consciousness; and how finally our knowledge of the thing thus acquired, being consolidated by Retention, develops into what we ordinarily call a Percept. With this consolidating operation of Retention the range of Perception closes. Further development of consciousness is through Paroksha Pramana or Ideation as spoken of in modern European psychology.

Like Pratyaksha, Paroksha also has its grades and modes. The first mode Smarana or Recollection helps us to reproduce and recognise a percept. The next is Pratyabhijñā or Conception, by means of which we compare ideas and form general ideas. The third mode Uha is Induction and establishes relations between general ideas. Anumana is the next step in the process of Ideation and deduces particular truths from inductive generalisations. The last mode of Paroksha Pramana consists in understanding and interpreting a system of

absolute and authoritative truths, the validity of which cannot be challenged.

7. Smriti.

Smriti or Smarana is Recollection and Recognition. According to Kanada, "Recollection is due to a peculiar Contact of the Soul with the mind and to the Trace (left on the Mind by a previous percept)" (Vide 9. 2. 6. Vaisesika-Sutras)." In 3—2—44 Gautama describes Attention etc. as the causes of Recollection. Reference to Smriti is made in 42 and 43, Pradhana-karyadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras and in 6 and 11, Samadhi-pada Yoga-Sutras. The theory of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy about Recollection is that it is a faculty consisting in mentally reviving an object of perception, the revival being possible through the persistence of Traces left in the Mind by the former perception and through some suggestion being made towards its revival. The Jaina account of Smarana is as follows :—"Recollection (or Recognition) consists in a knowledge of the form, 'This is That,' its object being an object previously perceived and now mentally revived through Traces (left in the mind)" (Vadi-deva.)

The orthodox systems contend that the matter or the content of Recollection is the same as that of Perception. Smriti, in other words, is nothing but Pratyaksha in a fainter form. Hence the philosophers of the orthodox schools see no utility in admitting Recollection as a special source of knowledge or rather, a source a special knowledge. This perceptual theory of Recollection is supported by Hobbes when he says that Memory is nothing but "decaying sense." Locke also upheld this theory and he is followed by Hume who distinctly says that the difference between a percept and a memory-idea is one of vivacity only.

It must be admitted that in a great majority of cases, the difference between a percept and a revived idea seems to be one of intensity only. The true theory, however, is that the former is sensuous and is essentially different from the latter which is evolved from within. "An ability to revive our ideas or perceptions," says Reid "after they have ceased to be can signify no more than an ability to create new ideas or perceptions, similar to those, we have had before." And then, is it absolutely true that the matters of perception and recollection are the same? Locke himself admitted that the contents of recollection are not exactly identical with those of perception in as much as the former have "the additional perception:

annexed to them that it (the mind) had them before."

All these considerations are implied in the Jaina contention that Recollection is a source of special knowledge and not a mode of Perception. Ratna-prabhacharyya points out that if Smriti is Pratyaksha, why, then, Anumana also is so; for Anumana is dependent on previous perception. In perception, says the Jaina thinker, we have "the fact that it is being perceived." In recollection what we have is the fact that the object was perceived. The Jainas are accordingly right in looking upon Smriti as a Pramana.

Lastly, it is to be noted that the Jaina thinkers in regarding Recollection as a faculty of the Soul, reject the doctrine of the materialists of all times, who account for Recollection by "Brain-cell-connection" or "paths of association in the brain."

8. Pratyabhijna.

"Pratyabhijna," says Vadi-deva. "is knowledge, consisting in association, is due to perception and recollection and has for its matter, species-idea, essential identity and so on." The elements of Pratyabhijna

are perception and recollection and it consists in comparing their matters. This comparison yields various results. (1) When we see a 'Gabaya', we almost automatically judge that a 'Gabaya' is similar to a 'Go' (Cow). Here Pratyabhijna is almost identical with the process of assimilation and lays the foundation for the Association by Similarity. (2) The second application of the principle of Pratyabhijna is made in our judgment 'A Buffalo is dissimilar to a Cow.' In such cases, Pratyabhijna is identical with differentiation and accounts for our Association of Ideas by Contrast. (3) The third application of Pratyabhijna would be in cases where it finds out Similarity, Sameness or Identity in Difference. Thus a person, Jinadatta may at one time be found sitting; at another time, standing; at a third time, walking and so on. In spite of these states which are admittedly different, the principle of Pratyabhijna discovers that it is the self-same Jinadatta who is manifested in these different states: Pratyabhijna finds out in such cases what is technically called Urdhata-samanya or Essential Identity. In this aspect, Pratyabhijna is 'akin' to Conception of modern psychology. (4) The last mode of Pratyabhijna discovers Sameness, or Similarity not in the different states or modes of activity of the self-same thing but in the characteristics of the various

individuals belonging to a class. This is Classification and Division, consisting in the discovery of Tiryak-samanya i.e., Species-idea or class-essence.

The orthodox philosophers also use the term, Pratyabhijna in the various places of their systems (Vide 34, Vishayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras, Sankara's commentary on 25, Second Chapter, Vedanta-Sutras, 3-2-2, Nyaya-Sutras) but everywhere they use it in the sense of its third mode only, described above. In other words, Pratyabhijna with them consists in a consciousness of Essential Identity. The orthodox thinkers, however, choose to express Pratyabhijna in its first and fourth senses by the term, Upamana. "Upamana," says Gautama, (Nyaya-Sutra 1. 1. 6)." consists in knowing a fact with the help of the conception of Similarity." The Jaina philosophers object to the identification of Pratyabhijna with Upamana on the ground that Pratyabhijna, as we have seen already, includes such Judgments as "A buffalo is dissimilar to a Cow", as well. Pratyabhijna thus has a wider application than Upamana.

The Jainas contend that both the judgments 'A Buffalo is similar to a Cow' and 'A Buffalo is dissimilar to a Cow,' are psychologically the same in as much as both are based on Association or 'Samkalana.' The great Nyaya thinker, Vachaspati Misra seems to

admit this when he speaks of a mode of Upamana, called Vaidharmya-Upamana i.e., Upamana dealing with or based on Dissimilarity. The Mimansakas, on the contrary, explain Dissimilarity as simply the want of Similarity. Accordingly, they maintain that Upamana deals with Similarity and Similar only and that judgments regarding Dissimilarity and Dissimilars are accounted for by the Abhava-Pramana. The Jainas point out that a similar line of argument may yield that Similarity is the want of Dissimilarity and that judgment of Similarity are accounted for not by Upamana but by Abhava. Hence it appears that the Jaina doctrine of Pratyabhijna is the only comprehensive one.

The Buddhist philosophers object to the Jaina theory of Conception on the ground that our sensations being strictly individualistic and momentary, no real comparison of sensations and no real conception is possible. The Buddhist doctrine is similar to that of Heraclitus of ancient Greece and leads to the Nominalistic position of Roscelin of mediaeval Europe. The Buddhist theory of Impermanence is, however, a suicidal doctrine as in strict consistency, it itself can lay no claim to one's permanent acceptance of it. Then, again, the extreme individuality of each phenomenon is denied by the Buddhist himself when he applies the same name to a number of things. This shows that

Conception is not only psychologically possible but that its matter i.e., the Concept or the Universal is objectively real.

But if Buddhist philosophy was an exponent of extreme Nominalism, there are extreme forms of Realism also. These consist in denying the reality of individuals and looking upon the Universal as the only reality. The Vedanta system embodied such a form of extremerealism when it asserted, "The Brahman is the only reality,—the world, unreal." Similarly, in ancient Greece, the school of Parmenides held the doctrine of abstract realism in its extreme monistic form. In mediaeval Europe, again, William of Champeaux was an extreme realist according to whom only the genera had any reality.

It seems that truth lies in systems of thought which adopt the viamedia, between the extreme nominalism and the extreme realism. The middle course would be to admit the reality of both the Individual and the Universal. This was the course chosen by Abelard of the mediaeval school in Europe and by Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece. In India, the Nyaya, the Vaiseshika and the Jaina schools maintained that the Individual is real as well as the Universal.

Yet when the question of relationship between the Universal and the Particular,—the Samanya and the

Visesha—is raised, the Jaina logic becomes sharply opposed to the Nyaya and the Vaisesika. "Being," says Kanada "is a separate Reality from Substance, Attribute and Activity (1. 1. 8.)" The Nyaya and the Vaisesika doctrine, in other words, is that the Universal does not *underlie* but rather co-exists with the Individual. This transcendentalist doctrine of the Samanya is obviously similar to the Platonic theory of the Idea in ancient Greece and the Universalia Ante Res doctrine of the mediaeval Europe. But the transcendental doctrine of the Universal, in its extreme form, is an impossible position. The Samanya must be essentially related to the Vishesha, the Universal must be in the Individual. Accordingly, even the Platonic, the Nyaya and the Vaisesika philosophers often lean towards the immanent theory of the Universal. It is Aristotle in ancient Greece who upheld such a theory. In mediaeval Europe also, there were prominent thinkers e.g., Gilbert of Poitiers, who in their own scholastic way contended that the *Universalia* must be in *re*. It is the Jaina philosophers in India who held that the Samanya, although transcendent in some sense, is immanent in the Vishesha and that these are practically the two aspects of the self-same reality. Ratnaprabhacharyya, the Jaina commentator means this when he says, "As the Universal is

not opposed to the Individuals, it may be regarded as many while the Individuals not being opposed to the Universal may be treated as one."

Coming now once more back to the doctrine of Pratyabhijna we find some schools of Indian philosophy of a strong Buddhistic bias, rejecting the Pramana-hood of Pratyabhijna. Conception or assimilation is not a process yielding any positive matter but it gives only negative ideas i.e., cognitions of non-particularity. The Jainas criticise this doctrine by pointing out that Conception does give positive matter. The thinkers of the Sankhya school also join with the Jainas in repudiating this negative theory of Conception. "A Concept," says Kapila, "does not consist in the negation of something, because it gives us the idea of something positive (93, Parapaksha-nirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras)."

The Sankhya logicians, however, differ from the Jaina in regarding the Samanya as a matter of perception. In other words, although Kapila recognises the validity of the matter of Pratyabhijna or Upamana, he regards it not as an independent Pramana but as a species of Pratyaksha, (Vide 94—95, Parapaksha-nirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras). The Jaina philosophers point out that Pratyabhijna is not to be identified with Pratyaksha, as it involves an element of

Recollection. Besides, whereas Pratyaksha or Perception gives us the Knowledge of a particular object, Pratyabhijna or Conception consists in establishing a Samjna-Samjni-Sambandha' i.e., in naming and classifying it.

Lastly, the Vaiseshika school regards Pratyabhijna or Upamana as a mode of Anumana on the ground that it is a mediate process. The Jainas and the Nyaya philosophers reject this theory. "Upamana consists in the discovery of Similarity and is thus different from Anumana. (2. 1. 46—Nyaya-Sutras)."

9. Uha.

Pratyabhijana consists in conception and gives us general ideas and the ideas of essence. The next process in Ideation and ideal development would be to connect one concept with another and thus to arrive at Judgments or propositions of general application. This process is called Uha or Tarka in the Jaina philosophy and is obviously akin to Induction of the western logic. "Tarka, otherwise called Uha consists in a knowledge of the form, 'This being, this is' etc., expressing the relationship between the Proven and the Mark, of eternal application and due to cognition and non-

cognition (Vadi-deva)." Gautama, in his Nyaya philosophy, however, puts a different interpretation or Uha or Tarka. According to him, it stands simply for a psychical process which is intermediate between Doubt and Determination (Vide 1. 1. 40 Nyaya-Sutras). It is to a great extent similar to argumentation in and through Hypothesis in modern logic but is not identical with Induction, as the Jaina thinkers would have it.

But although the orthodox logicians did not mean Induction by the term, Uha, the process of Generalisation was not left unnoticed by them. They affirmed the validity of Anumana or Ratiocination and they knew that Syllogism was impossible unless a truth of general application was implied in the premise from which the conclusion would be deducible. This unconditional or essential relationship between the Proven and the Mark is called Vyapti or Pratibandha (Vide 29, Parapakshanirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras and 67-68, Bhasha-Parichcheda). Vyapti again may be of two modes—Sama-vyapti and Vishama-vyapti. Where the two phenomena essentially related, are exactly co-extensive,—We have Sama-vyapti, as in the case of 'being a product' and 'being non-eternal.' On the other hand, there may be two phenomena which may not be exactly co-extensive, although the relationship

between them is universal, as in the case of Fire and Smoke. In such cases, we have Vishama-vyapti.

Vyapti is thus inductive generalisation and the orthodox logicians of India (as well as the Jainas) held Vyapti to be a real relationship between the substances, implied by the Sadhya and the Hetu and not merely an arithmetical sumtotal of the particular facts of experience.

The philosophers of the Buddhist school deny the validity of Uha and inductive generalisations. With them, the Universal is a name and the essentiality, underlying the varied manifestations of a thing is a non-existence and unreality. If then there are no Essences and no Universals, how is a relation possible between Essence and Essence and Universal and Universal? The Buddhist theory is thus not very dissimilar to the position of the extreme empiricist who contends that it is the particulars of experience that have any reality for us and that the inductive truths are not demonstrably true and that these are taken on trust as it were. The theory of the Charvakas or the sophists also with regard to Induction is in agreement with that of the Buddhists.

Now, if there can be no valid Induction i.e., if it is either a summation of actual facts of experience or but a half truth, it is clear that the process of Anumana or Deductive Reasoning becomes equally impossible and

invalid. Mill was certainly consistent in declaring that, Syllogism is either useless or involves *petitio principii*. Similarly, the Charvakas were true to their fundamental position in asserting that Anumana was an invalid process as there could be no valid inductive truth at the back of it. Curiously, however, the Bhuddists, although they deny the validity of Induction, admit the possibility or validity of Anumana. The criticism of the Buddhist position by Ratnabrahmacharyya, the Jaina thinker is very pertinent. "If Tarka is not valid knowledge, then Anumana is lifeless,—because there is left no means of determining Pervasion." The Jainas show how general ideas are possible and valid and thus break down the sensationist standpoint of the Bhuddists upon which their objections to Tarka are really based.

The Indian doctrines of Induction are best studied in connection with the doctrine of Hetu. Vadi-deva defines Hetu thus:—"The only characteristic of the Mark is that it is never known to exist unless it be in connection with the Proven." This inseparable connection between the Mark and the Proven may be stated in two different ways—affirmatively (*Anvaya-vyapti*) e.g. Wherever there is smoke, there is Fire or negatively (*Vyatirekavyapti*) e.g. Wherever there is no Fire, there is no smoke. Corresponding

to the above two ways of indicating Pervasion, there has been a classification of Hetu into two kinds—Upalabdhi-Hetu and the Anupalabdhi-Hetu, the Positively Determined and the Negatively Determined Mark. Both the Upalabdhi and the Anupalabdhi Hetu may be either Aviruddha or agreeable and Viruddha or opposed to the Sadhya. Hence we get the four broad classes of Hetu—1. Upalabdhi Aviruddha 2. Upalabdhi Viruddha. 3. Anupalabdhi Aviruddha and 4. Anupalabdhi Viruddha.

The further question is,—What is the exact nature of the relation of the Hetu to the Sadhya? This point leads to one of the most important problems of logic of all times.

The extreme monists of the strong Vedantic bias would have a spiritual conception of A in the judgment A is B and would treat B simply as an imagined modification of the nature of A. In other words, the relation between the two terms A and B would be in all cases one of identity, according to these philosophers. The Buddhists, however, contend that the Hetu may be either identical in nature with the Proven (Svabhava, Hetu) or be its effect (Karya-Hetu). In other words—according to the Buddhists, we may conclude A from B if the latter be identical in nature with A or be its effect. On the other hand, the Buddhists take care in pointing

out that although we can infer the cause (Fire) from the effect (smoke), we cannot similarly infer the effect from the cause in all cases. Besides the Svabhava and the Karya Hetus, the Buddhists admit Anupalabdhi Hetus, whose agreement with the Proven is not positively cognised. The Vaiseshika philosophers, however, mention five kinds of Hetus. (1) The Hetu may be the Karya of the Sadhya. (2) It may be the Karana of the Sadhya. (3) It may be the Samyogi of the Sadhya i.e., united with it. (4) It may be the Virodhi of the Sadhya i.e., antagonistic to the Sadhya. (5) It may be the Samavayi of the Sadhya i.e., essentially related to the Proven. The Jainas give the most comprehensive view and roughly speaking, conceive of no less than eight kinds of the Hetus from which the Sadhya may be validly inferred. These are—(1) The Hetu may be the Vyapya of the Sadhya i.e., coextensive with a part of the Proven. (2) It may be the Karya of the Sadhya. (3) It may be the Karana of the Sadhya. (4) It may be the Purvachara of the Sadhya i.e., an invariable antecedent of the Proven. (5) It may be the Uttara-chara of the Sadhya i.e., an invariable consequent of the Proven. (6) It may be the Sahachara of the Sadhya i.e., an invariable coexistent of the Proven. (7) It may be the Svabhava or the essence of the Proven. (8) It may be the Virodhi of the Sadhya i.e., antagonistic to it.

Hetus, we have seen, are primarily divided into four classes by the Jainas viz., Aviruddha-Upalabdhi, Viruddha-Upalabdhi, Aviruddha-anupalabdhi and Viruddha-anupalabdhi. Let us take these one by one.

1. The Aviruddha-upalabdhi Hetu is a Bidhi-Sadhaka one (*i.e.*, leads to a positive conclusion) and may be of six modes. (a) The A-u-vyapya, *c.g.*, (Sound is subject to modification) because it is a product. (b) The A-u-karya, *c.g.*, (There is fire in this hill grove), because smoke is seen. (c) The A-u-karana, *c.g.* (There will be a shower of Rain) because cloud, indicative of that, is seen. (d) The A-u-purva-chara, *c.g.*, (A Muhurta after Tishya-star will rise) because Punarvasu is seen to rise. (e) The A-u-uttarachara, *c.g.*, (A Muhurta before Purva-phalguni-star rose) because Uttara-phalguni is seen to rise. (f) The A-u-Sahachara, *c.g.* (There is a peculiar colour in this mango-fruit) because it has a peculiar taste.

2. The Viruddha-upalabdhi Hetu is a Nishedha-Sadhaka one (*i.e.*, leads to a negative conclusion) and may be of seven modes. (a) The V-u-Svabhava, *c.g.* (There cannot be only one aspect of a thing) because many aspects are seen. (b) The V-u-vyapya, *c.g.* (This man has not true knowledge) because he

has doubts. (c) The V-u-karya, e.g. (This man's anger has not subsided) because he has a frowning face. (d) The V-u-karana, e.g. The word of this sage is not untrue) because he has knowledge, unstained by attachment and malice. (e) V-u-purvachara, e.g., (A Muhurta after, Pushya-star will not rise) because Rohini is rising. (f) The V-u-uttarachara, e.g., (A Muhurta before Mirigasira did not rise) because (Purva-phalguni is rising. (g) The V-u-sahachara, e.g. (This man has not false knowledge) because he has right faith.

3. The Aviruddha-anupalabdhi Hetu is a Nishedha-Sadhaka one and may be of seven modes.

(a) The A-a-svabhava e.g., (Here there is no pitcher) because a thing of its nature is not seen here. (b) The

A-a-vyapya e.g., (Here there is no Panasa) because there is no tree here. (c) The A-a-karya e.g., (There is no potent seed here) because no shoot is seen here.

(d) The A-a-karana, e.g. (This man has not the sentiments e.g., peacefulness etc.), because he is not

found to have any regard for truth. (e) The A-a-purvachara e.g., (A Muhurta after Svati-star will not rise) because Chitra is not seen to rise. (f) A-a-uttar-

achara e.g. (A Muhurta before Purva-bhādrapada did not rise) because Uttara-bhādrapada is not seen to

rise. (g) The A-a-sahachara e.g. This man has not

right knowledge) because he is not found to have right faith.

4. The Viruddha-anupalabdhi Hetu is a Bidhi-Sadhaka one and may be of five modes. (a) The V-a-karya e.g., (This animal has some disease) because he is not found to have the marks of health. (b) The V-a-karana e.g. (This animal has difficulties) because he is not joined to the objects of his desire. (c) The V-a-Svabhava e.g. (Things have many aspects) because the nature of having one aspect only is not seen. (d) The V-a-Vyapya, e.g. (Here there is shade) because heat is not perceived. (e) The V-a-Sahachara, e.g. (This man has false knowledge) because he is not found to have right faith.

According to the author of the Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara, Hetus can be of the above 25 modes. It may be said also that an Inductive generalisation, worked out by Tarka can be conceived and expressed in any of the 25 ways.

A few words in conclusion about the nature or characteristic of the Mark seem to be necessary. According to the Jainas, "The only characteristic of the Mark is that it is never known to exist unless it be in connection with the Proven. (Vadi-deva)." The Buddhist logicians however, refer to three characteristics of a valid Mark. These are;—1. Paksha-

dharmata : Connection of the Mark with the Abode of the Proven. The 'Smoke' (Mark in the stock-example) must be on the 'Hill' (Minor Term). (2) Sapaksha-Satta : Existence of the Mark in the phenomena which are homogeneous with the Proven. 'Smoke' abides in a 'Kitchen' which is homogeneous with things that contain 'Fire.' 3. Vipaksha-Satta : Absence of the Mark in the phenomena which are heterogeneous from the Proven. 'Smoke' does not abide in a 'Lake' which is heterogeneous from things that contain 'Fire.' The philosophers of the Nyaya school admit these three characteristics and add two others viz. (4) Avadhita-vishayatva : The Middle Term should not be such as to establish the very opposite of what is to be proved. (5) Asat-pratipakshata : The Mark should not be such as to leave doubtful what is to be proved.

The Jainas reject the above doctrines of Hetu and hold that if the Hetu be not essentially connected with the Sadhya, all its other characteristics, as described by the Nyaya and the Saugata schools cannot make it a 'Saddhetu' or valid Mark. Thus let us have the Anumana :—A is green-black ; because he is B's son ; like all other children of B but unlike other men's children. Here although the Mark, 'B's son-hood' exhibits all the characteristics of a valid Hetu, it is not

a true one. Why? Because, as the Jainas point out, there is no necessary connection between 'B's son-hood' and 'green-black complexion.' The Buddhists, however, point out that the given Hetu is not valid as it does not fulfil the third requirement, Vipakshasatta. There is no reason why a person who is not green-black cannot be B's son. The Jainas contend that this is but a circuitous way of admitting that 'B's son-hood' is not the proper Mark here because there is no necessary connection between it and 'green-blackness.' The Naiyayikas, on the contrary, show that the given Hetu is not valid as it does not show the fifth characteristic. Is 'B's son-hood' such a fact that it leaves out of question all possibilities of a complexion other than green-black? The Naiyayikas point out that in order that this test may be fulfilled there must be Anaupadhika Sambandha or unconditional relationship between the Mark and the Proven. The Jaina logicians contend that Anaupadhika Sambandha means just Nischitanyathanupapatti or necessary connection which is the only characteristic of a valid Mark according to them.

10. Anumana.

Uha or Induction gives us abstract truths and it lies with Anumana or Ratiocination to apply them to particular cases and arrive at facts previously unknown. As Aristotle says : " A Syllogism is a symbol in which some things having been posited, something different from the assumptious necessarily joins itself to them by being involved in the being of the facts assumed." Deduction is thus not a useless process but gives new truths. "The unperceived become known," says Kapila in 58, Vishayadhyaya, 'Sankhya-sutras, " through Anumana, as Fire because of Smoke."

Anumana according to the Jaina logicians, is of two modes, Svartha and Parartha. The former consists in a reasoning which gives truth to one's own self. The latter consists in a reasoning which conveys some truth to another. This division of Anumana into Svartha and Parartha by the Jainas is accepted by the logicians of the Vaiseshika school as Sankara Misra, the Vaiseshika thinker says, " Anumana is of two sorts viz., Svartha and Parartha. Of these, the Svartha is due to one's own discovery of the facts of pervasion and of the existence of the Mark in the abode, while the Parartha is due to another man's instructions (in words) about the facts of pervasion and of the existence of the Mark in the Abode." The Jaina

classification of Anumana into Svārtha and Parārtha is also accepted by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logicians.

The older Nyāya school, however, recognises three modes of Anumana viz., Purvavat, Seshavat and Samanyatodrishta. The first consists in an inference of the effect from the Cause. We infer for instance that there will be a shower of rain when we see clouds in the sky. Seshavat Anumana is conversely an inference of the cause from the Effect, e.g., We infer that there was a shower of rain towards the source of the river when we see a sudden increase of water and swiftness of the current in the stream. Samanyatodrishta Anumana consists in the inference of a fact similar to one already observed, e.g., We infer that the sun has motion because it (like previously observed moving things) is found to change its place in the sky from time to time. Besides the above meanings, Vatsyāna gives other meanings of Purvavat, Seshavat and Samanyatodrishta. According to this second interpretation, Purvavat is so called because its conclusion is arrived at through the help of a relationship, already known. Inference of Fire from Smoke is based on a relationship between Fire and Smoke, previously observed. Seshavat Anumana in its second sense is practically identical with the Disjunctive Syllogism.

Sound is either a Substance or an Activity or an Attribute. It is found to be neither a Substance nor an Activity. It must then be the Sesha, i.e., what remains, viz., an Attribute. Samanyatodrishta consists in analogical reasoning. Thus, Desire, etc., are attributes; attributes, however, cannot exist unless with reference to a substance, say a pitcher; so, if Desire, etc., are attributes, they prove the existence of the Soul as the abode of the attributes.

The Neo-nyaya thinkers describe the three modes of Anumana as Kevalanvayi, Kevala-vyatireki and Anvaya-vyatireki. In Kevalanvayi the Proven is positively perceived to be present wherever the Mark is seen. For example, "This is knowable, because it is named." Here the Vyapti is determined by observing the instances in which 'knowability' and 'being named' seem to be related. In Kevala-vyatireki, on the other hand, Vyapti is dependent on the experience that the opposite of the Proven and the opposite of the Mark are found to be so related that what is opposed to the opposite of the Proven is judged to be necessarily related to what is opposed to the opposite of the Mark. For example, "Earth is distinct from other Elements, because it is possessed of Smell." Here the Vyapti is accounted for in this way. Water, Air, etc., are elements different from Earth;

they are its Abhavas. Similarly, Coolness, Touch etc., are the Abhavas of the given Hetu here viz., Smell. Experience gives us that the Abhavas of the given Hetu here are related to the Abhavas of the given Sadhya here. This leads to the required Vyapti that what is opposed to the Abhavas of the Hetu here (Smell) is necessarily related to what is opposed to the Abhavas of the Sadhya (Earth). In Anvaya-vyatireki, both the positive and the negative experiences are instrumental in giving us the knowledge of the Vyapati. The relationship between Smoke and Fire is such an instance. We have the positive experience that wherever there is Smoke there is Fire and the negative experience that where there is no Fire, there is no Smoke.

It may be said that the Jaina way of dividing Anumana into Svārtha and Parārtha (followed by the Buddhist and the Vaiseshika Schools of logic) has been its real and recognisable division while the Nyaya classification is more a classification of Vyapti and Hetu than of Anumana itself. At any rate, the Jainas classify Anumana in reference to the man who reasons; while the latter does it with regard to the objects and their relationship involved in the reasoning. The standpoint of the former is subjective and psychological, that of the latter is objective and real. It may

safely be said that neither of the two modes of classifying Anumana has a tendency to reduce the process of Ratiocination to a dull mechanism. The Indian logicians speak of facts and ideas and not of 'terms'; they deal with necessary connections between phenomena and not with rhetorical or mechanical 'distributions of middle terms.' We do not meet with Moods and Figures in the systems of Indian syllogism. The Indian logic is practical in its nature; symbolic logic was a monstrosity for the Indians.

The practical nature of Indian logic will be further apparent from the Jaina conception of the Sadhya. According to Vadi-deva, "The Proven is undetermined (i.e., previously unknown); it must not be opposed to the facts of experience; it must be something which is desired to be proven."

Coming back to the nature of Anumana, we may say that its elements are (1) The Hetu or the Mark, (2) The Paksha or the Minor Term and (3) The Sadhya or the Major Term or the Proven. The doctrine of Hetu has been fully dealt with in the last section.

The Paksha is what contains the Proven. 'Hill' in the stock-example is the Paksha because it contains 'Fire,' the Proven. It is seriously contended by some of the logicians of the Buddhist school that the

statement indicating the Paksha is not a necessary limb in an Anumana as one would feel no difficulty in drawing the proper conclusion if he be given the proper premises.

The Jaina logicians hold on the contrary that the Minor Term is as essential to Anumana as the Mark itself. Anumana is not simply the Knowledge of the presence of the unobserved thing but the knowledge of its presence in or in relation to an observed thing. Not the knowledge of Fire but that of its presence in the Hill is the Anumana. Hence the Minor Term is essential to Anumana. The utility or the use of the Minor Term consists in this that it clears up all ambiguities regarding the matter of conclusion. The Jaina logician candidly admits after all, that if the audience is intelligent enough, the explicit statement of the Paksha is not necessary. As Prabhachandra says, "If the Paksha is not stated, some dull persons may not understand the real conclusion. The omission of the Paksha is recommended, however, in cases where the real conclusion is understood even without it."

The Jaina school maintains that the statement of the Paksha and the statement of the Hetu (Pratijna and Hetu) are the only two limbs in an Anumana. An Anumana according to the Jaina School is of the form:—
This Hill is Firey ; Because it is full of Smoke. The

Buddhist logicians admit the elements of the above two limbs but choose to add a third viz., the Dristanta. A Dristanta is an instance which serves to corroborate or remind one self of the fact of the invariable connection between the Proven and the Mark and may be of two kinds, Sadharmya or Homogeneous and Vaidharmya or Heterogeneous. The former is an instance (Kitchen) where the Hetu (Smoke) being present, the Sadhya (Fire) appears without fail while the latter is an instance (Pond) where the Sadhya being absent, the Hetu becomes absent also. According to the logicians of the Buddhist school proposition indicative of such positive and negative examples should find its place in Anumana. The form of reasoning according to the Buddhists is as follows:—All that has Smoke is Fire like a Kitchen and Whatever is not Fire has no Smoke like a Lake; This Hill has Smoke.

The Mimamsaka logicians point out that there should be only three limbs in an Anumana. According to them, however, a valid syllogism is either of the two forms. (1) This Hill is Fire (Pratijna); Because it is full of Smoke (Hetu); Whatever is full of Smoke is Fire as for example etc., etc., (Dristanta) (2) Whatever is full of Smoke is Fire as for example etc., etc., (Dristanta); Now this is so i.e., this Hill is full of Smoke (Upanaya); Therefore, this Hill is Fire

(Nigamana). A Mimamsaka syllogism therefore is sometimes similar in form to the three-limbed syllogism of the Aristotelian and the modern European school.

The thinkers of the other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy call Anumana Panchavayava or five-limbed. (Vide: 27 Parapakshanirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras; 1. 1. 32, 39, Nyaya-Sutras etc.) Besides Pratijna, Hetu and Dristanta, they would have a fourth proposition, stating the Upanaya or Application of the Hetu to the Paksha and a concluding judgment, embodying the conclusion. The syllogism according to them is as follows.—This Hill is Firy; Because it has Smoke; All that has Smoke is Firy like a Kitchen and whatever is not Firy has no Smoke like a Lake; Now this Hill has Smoke; Therefore, this Hill is Firy.

The Jaina logicians contend that a syllogism should always be two-limbed. Dristanta, Upanaya and Nigamana are superfluous. These do not give us the Vyapti which is already got through the Tarka-Pramana or Induction. An intelligent man does not require these propositions to remind him of the Vyapti. The Paksha and the Hetu are sufficient to convince him of the truth. (Vide Pramana-naya-tattvalokalam-kara, 28-40, 3rd, chapter.) As a matter of fact, some of the Buddhist logicians admit that in the case of an intelligent person, Dristanta is redundant.

On the other hand, if the disciple is a dull person, the Jainas hold Anumana should contain more than the two limbs, Paksha and Hetu. Anumana, in such a case, should be three-limbed or five-limbed. The Jainas go even further and say that to convince a dull person, every proposition in a five-limbed syllogism should be followed by a premise, correcting it. Thus the Uttama or the best form of Anumana in the case of a dull person should be ten-limbed. These ten-limbs of a Jaina syllogism are to be distinguished from the ten-limbs, mentioned by a particular class of Nyaya thinkers of the time of Vatsayana. These ten limbs are the five already admitted by Gautama and the following five. (1) Jijñāṣa or a desire to know the details of a vaguely known phenomenon. (2) Samsaya or doubt as to the real nature of a phenomenon. (3) Sakya-prāpti or the ability of the knower to know the phenomenon and the capability of the evidence to prove it. (4) Prayojana or the necessity of determining the phenomenon. (5) Samsaya-vyudasa or the destruction of doubt. Vatsayana pertinently remarks that these five are not really parts of a logical syllogism.

The characteristics of a real Sadhya have already been incidentally noted. It remains now to be discussed what the Sadhya or the Proven is. To what does the

process of inference actually relate? This is the question.

The great Buddhist Scholar Dignaga in his *Pramana-Samchchaya* contends that it is not Fire nor the connection between it and the Hill but it is the Fire Hill that is inferred. Kumarila also in his *Sloka-vartika* admits this and says "What is inferred is the Minor Term attended with a particular phenomenon, Dharma." The older school of the orthodox Nyaya thinkers attached two meanings to the Sadhya. "The Proven is of two sorts," says Vatsayana, "it is either a phenomenon existing in the Minor Term e.g., the non-eternity of (i.e., in) Sound or the Minor Term, attended with the phenomenon e.g., Sound (is) non-eternal." The first view is held by orthodox Neo-Nyaya thinkers and the second, as will be apparent, is upheld by the Buddhist and Mimamsaka logicians. We may leave out of consideration here, the contention of Udyotakara, according to which the Proven is no other than the Mark or the Middle Term itself. If on an occasion we see Smoke on a Hill-top, our correct conclusion would be that that particular Smoke is attended with Fire.

The Jainas recognise the force of the argument of the Neo-Nyaya logicians that if anything can be inferred from the existence of Smoke, it is certainly Fire and

not a Hill (attended with Fire) because it is Fire that pervades Smoke and not the Hill. But the Jaina logicians choose to attribute to the Sadhya, the meaning attributed to it by the Buddhist school. The Jaina theory of the Sadhya is thus well-expressed by Vadi-deva :—"So far as the question of Pervasion is concerned, the Proven is the phenomenon (Dharma,—Fire); otherwise Vyapti is not possible. It cannot be said that wherever there is Smoke, there is as rule the Hill, as there is Fire. But so far as the matter of conclusion is concerned, it (the Proven or the Sadhya) is the well-known Abode, otherwise known as the Minor Term (Hill), attended with that (*i.e.*, the phenomenon, Dharma,—Fire)."

11. Agama.

The last source of Indirect Knowledge, according to the thinkers of the Jaina school is Agama or Words of Authority. "An authority," says Vadi-deva, "is one who knows a thing as it is and describes it according to his knowledge." The Indian philosophers of old were not bigoted thinkers, as is commonly supposed but were quite ready to sit at the feet of persons who could teach them. Ratnaprabhacharyya, while describing a Teacher, says, "Hence he who does not deceive one

(and is capable of teaching him) is his teacher." This definition of the teacher may apply to a Rishi, an Arya or a Mlechchha." Vatsayana, the Nyaya Commentator, endorses the same view and says "An Authority is he who has directly observed the nature of things; is a teacher who is ready to give out what he has observed; and through whom the nature of things can be observed. This is the common definition of all teachers,—whether he be a Rishi, an Arya or a Mlechchha."

According to the Jainas, a teacher is either Human or Superhuman,—according as he gives instructions regarding matters mundane or matters supermundane and spiritually efficacious. Human teachers are one's parents, instructors and social superiors; while the Superhuman Teacher is the Arhat or Tirthamkara Himself who reveals the true nature of things and shows the way to final emancipation. The words of the Tirthamkara are unimpeachable revelations of Truth and constitute the Jaina Agama or the Jaina Veda.

The Agama it would be seen, is regarded as an important source of Knowledge by the thinkers of the orthodox school also. But according to these, the Agama is the reputed Vedas of India (viz., the Saman, the Rik, the Yajus and the Atharvan). Yet again while

the orthodox schools agree in relying on the Vedas as the highest and the most infallible authority, they are opposed to each other, so far as the question of their nature is concerned. The two schools of Mimamsa maintain that the Vedas are (i) eternal and (ii) self-existent. Kapila, on the other hand, contends that "the Vedas are not eternal because it is said that they were produced." (45, Parapaksha-nirjayadhyaya, Sankhya-Sutras). The thinkers of the Sankhya school are, however, unwilling to dispute the other dogma of the Mimamsaka school, that the Vedas are self-existent i.e., not made by any being (Vide Sankhya-Sutras, 46—50 Parapakshānirjāyadhyaya). The next application of rationalism to the Mimamsaka orthodoxy was made by Kanada who proceeds to show that the Vedas bear evidences of being made (by an intelligent Being). (Vide Vaisesika-Sutra, 6—1—1 : 4). So, the Mimamsaka position is finally undermined. According to it, the Vedas are eternal and Self-existent. The philosophers of the Sankhya school contend that they are not eternal, although self-existent. Finally, the Nyaya and the Vaisesika-schools maintain that the Vedas are neither eternal nor self-existent. The one dogma which, however, is shared in common by all the orthodox systems, is that the Vedas are infallible.

The last step in criticism was taken by the Buddhists and the Charvaka sophists who repudiated the authority of the Agama. "The Vedas are untrue, tainted as they are with falsity, contradiction and tautology (1. 2. 56, Nyaya-Sutra)." Accordingly, as we have seen already, the Charvakas looked upon sensuous perception as the only source of knowledge; the Agama is not a source of true knowledge. The Jainas agree with the Charvakas and the Buddhists in their criticism of the doctrine of the Vedic infallibility. But they would point out that as there is no inconsistency and false teaching in the Jaina Vedas and as these emanate from the Being who saw the Truth face to face and taught as he saw it,—the Jaina Agama is an important and infallible source of knowledge.

The theory of Sound is connected with the doctrine of the Agama. The Scripture is nothing but a peculiarly arranged mass of letters or sounds and if these sounds be supposed to be non-eternal, the Scripture itself becomes non-eternal. And further, if the sounds be not essentially related to the nature of objects, they cannot infallibly express the truths underlying them, so that the Vedas become unreliable. Accordingly the Mimansakas make a distinction between Dhvani or ordinary sound and Sphota or the eternal and the unchangeable Sound. The Vedas

consist of such Sphota sounds which are essentially related to the eternal truths and are consequently eternal (Vide Mimansaka-Sutras, 1. 1. 5 : 20)

The extreme opposite of the above form of Mimansaka dogmatism is the Buddhist theory according to which, sounds or words are not only not eternal but they have no real relation whatsoever to the objects they are said to signify. Sounds and objects signified by them cannot be said to be identical in essence. You cannot moreover, say that the sounds are caused by the objects signified by them ; nor can you say that the latter are caused by the former. How is it then, that we attach particular meanings to the words and say that this word signifies this object and that, that ? According to the Buddhist theory of Apoha or Extrajection, sound is a sensation ; its matter also a sensation, consisting just in the negative idea that previous and other sensations do not exist for us at the time. Our mind has a tendency to build up a positive idea and to locate the matter of sound outside of and external to ourselves. It is this mysterious principle of mental Apoha or Extrajection,—the tendency to reify the psychoses—that is responsible for the attribution of meanings to words.

The Mimansaka and the Buddhist theories of sound are thus extreme opposites between which the Nyaya,

the Vaisheshika, the Sankhya and the Yoga doctrines may be said to seek the *via media*. The Nyaya philosophers admit that there is a relationship between sound and object; otherwise as Vatsayana says any word might have signified any object. But this relationship is not a real and essential relation, as the Mimansakas contend but one that is called *Samaya* or the relation between the Signifier (*Vachaka*) and the Signified (*Vachya*). As regards the nature of sound, Gautama says, "Sound is not eternal, as it has origination, as it is a matter of sensuous perception and as it is commonly treated as adventitious (2-2-14 Nyaya-Sutras)." Sound is looked upon by the Nyaya philosophers as the attribute of Akasa or Ether. The Vaisheshika theory of sound is exactly similar to the Nyaya one (Vide 2-2-21-37, Vaisheshika-Sutras). The Sankhya position is not dissimilar. "A word and its object," urges Kapila against the Buddhist position, "are related as Signifier and Signified." Then again, Kapila points out that there is no such thing perceived as *Sphota*; therefore, the Mimansaka theory is based rather on imagination. The Yoga theory of Sound may be best expressed in the words of Bhoja, "The relationship of the word and its object consisting in that of the Signifier and the Signified, is eternal. This relationship is signified by the meaning

of a word but is not established or created by any one."

The Jaina theory of Sound is also a mean between the Mimāṃsaka and the Buddhist theories but it has some originality of its own. According to the Jainas Sound is neither a real Substance (Mīmāṃsa), nor an unsubstantial internal phenomenon (Buddhists), nor an attribute of Ether (Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika) but is atomic or Pāṇḍalika in nature. The atoms that account for letter-sounds are called Bhasha-varganā atoms by the Jaina thinkers. The Jainas point out that Sound is similar to Odour in its nature and is transmitted in a way like that of Odour. The Jaina philosophers agree with the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the Yoga philosophers in maintaining that there is the Vachya-Vachaka-relationship between words and their objects. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers, however, explain this relationship by referring to God who is supposed to fix the meanings of particular words. The Jainas reject the Hypothesis of God and maintain that words themselves have a Svabhāva or natural force to signify their objects.

The celebrated theory of the Saptabhaṅga or of the Seven-fold Possibility may be considered in this connection. It arises in this way. The question is, What is the nature of the significance of a word? The

answer depends on one's theory of the nature of things. Those who hold that things of the universe have a purely positive nature, maintain that all expressions are positive *i.e.*, affirmative in significance. Those on the contrary who hold that things have a purely negative nature, contend that all expressions must be negative in significance. The Jains object to both these views and point out that all expressions have no less than seven significances. The Jaina theory is based on the Jaina doctrine of the nature of things which may be stated as follows :—(1) In some respect a thing is. (2) In some respect a thing is not. (3) Firstly, a thing is, then it is not. (4) Simultaneously, a thing is and is not. (5) A thing is and at the same time, it is and is not. (6) A thing is not and at the same time, it is and is not. (7) A thing firstly is, then it is not and then it is and is not simultaneously.

Curious as it might appear, the Jaina theory embodies a principle, the truth of which is unchallengeable. The Sophistic Charvaka philosophers attributed absolute reality to phenomena of ordinary experience. The Buddhists were equally dogmatic in asserting that all things were absolutely unsubstantial. The schools of Indian philosophy which proceeded on a criticism of these extreme systems of thought and sought to indicate

the true theory seemed to be guilty of onesidedness and consequent dogmatism. The correct position would be to take into consideration all the possible aspects of the phenomenon under consideration and make a comprehensive statement. This is exactly what the Jaina doctrine implies. It takes into consideration both the aspect of existence and the aspect of non-existence of a substance and instead of making a purely positive or a purely negative statement with regard to it, would give no less than seven statements, thus giving a comprehensive account of it.

The Jaina theory of the nature of the significance of an expression would be as follows :—1. In some respect, all expressions are positive. 2. In some respect, all expressions are negative. 3. In some respect, all expressions are first positive and then negative. 4. In some respect, all expressions are simultaneously positive and negative. 5. In some respect, all expressions are first positive and then, simultaneously positive and negative. 6. In some respect, all expressions are first negative and then simultaneously positive and negative. 7. In some respect, all expressions are first positive and then negative and then simultaneously positive and negative.

12. Pramanabhasa.

Pramanabhasa or fallacy with regard to Pramana means literally a form of Knowledge which looks like Pramana but is not really so. According to the Jaina philosophers, such fallacious Knowledge may be of 4 kinds according as they relate to the nature or the number or the object or the fruit of the Pramanas. These are as follows :—A. Svarupabhasa,—This fallacy consists in conceiving the Pramanas in a different way from that of the Jainas who define it as “certain Knowledge, regarding the Self and the non-self.” Accordingly, those definitions of the Pramana will be fallacious which consider it to consist in (1) unconscious processes (the Nyaya school), (2) a form of Knowledge which cannot reveal the self (the Mimamsaka school), (3) a form of Knowledge which reveals the Self only (the Vedanta school), (4) undetermined perception (the Buddhist school) or finally in (5) Superimposition (ordinary people). Going into details, we may describe the fallacies with regard to the Pratyaksha in this way. (1) Fallacies with regard to the Samvyavaharika Pratyaksha (a) one sees in Cloud, a city of the celestials,—Indriya-nibandhana-Pratyakshabhasa. (b) One feels pain in pleasure,—Anindriya-nibandhana-Pratyakshabhasa. (2) Fallacies with regard to the Paramarthika Pratyaksha—A royal

sage named Sibi found in the innumerable islands and seas of the world only seven islands and seven seas—Abadhi-jñanabhasa. There can be no fallacy with regard to the Manahparyaya and the Kevala. Fallacies of the Paroksha Pramana may now be considered. (1) One who has never come across any congregation of sages sees one and says, "It is that congregation of sages"—Smaranabhasa. (2) One sees a thing now; sometime after, another thing, similar to the first is presented before him when he says, "It is that"—Pratyabhijnabhasa, (3) Whoever is the son of Maitra is green-black—Tarkabhasa. (4) Anumanabhasa may be of various kinds: (a) Pakshabhasa or the fallacy of the Minor Term where the Sadhya is (i) already Pratita or Known or (ii) Nirakrita or opposed to the recognised Pramanas or (iii) Anabhipreta or not desired to be proved (b) Hetvabhasa or fallacy of the Middle Term is of three kinds. The Hetu may be (1) Asiddha or unproved or (2) Viruddha or opposed to the Proven or (3) Anaikantika or doubtful. (c) Dristantabhasa or Fallacy with regard to examples. Sadharmya Dristantabhasa is of nine kinds. A fallacious homogeneous example may be (1) dissimilar to the proven (2) opposed to the mark (3) opposed to both the proven and the mark (4) doubtfully similar to the proven (5) doubtfully similar to the mark (6) doubt-

fully similar to both the proven and the mark (7) unconnected with the matter to be proved (8) not expressly connected with the matter to be proved (9) stated in the opposite way. Vaidharmya-Dristantabhasa also is of nine kinds. A fallacious heterogeneous example may be (1) to some extent similar to the proven (2) similar to the mark (3) similar to both the proven and the mark (4) doubtfully dissimilar to the proven (5) doubtfully dissimilar to the mark (6) doubtfully dissimilar to both the proven and the mark (7) completely irrelevant and erroneous (8) not expressly dissimilar (9) stated in the opposite way. (d) The fourth mode of Anumanabhasa is Upanayabhasa which consists in substituting for Upanaya a proposition which is a different limb of the syllogism altogether. (e) Nigamanabhasa is drawing improper conclusion from the premises of a syllogism (5) Agamabhasa consists in irresponsible, false and frivolous utterances. These are the various kinds of the Svarupabhasa according to the Jaina logician. Of these, the Pakshabhasa, the Hetvabhasa and the Dristantabhasa are the most important and are treated at some length by the logicians of the Buddhist and the Orthodox Naiyayika schools also. The Buddhist account of Pakshabhasa is not opposed to the Jaina account given above. As regards the Dristantabhasa Dignaga

does not recognise the three modes of 'doubtful' (Sandhigdha) and the mode of 'unshown relation' (Apradarsita). Dharmakirti, however, recognised all the nine modes of the Dristantabhasa, given above. As to the classification of the Hetvabhasa, it would be seen that both Dignaga and Dharmakirti recognise its three broad sub-classes as described by the Jainas, viz., 1. Unproved. 2. Uncertain or doubtful. 3. Opposed or contradictory. That these modes of the Hetvabhasa were recognised by a section of the early orthodox logicians also will be apparent from the following utterance of Sankara Misra, the Vaiseshika thinker,—

"Kasyapa declared the fallacy of the mark to be of three kinds, namely, 1. The opposed. 2. The unproved and 3. The doubtful." In 3. 1. 15, the Vaiseshika-Sutra, Kanada subscribes to the same view. But Gautama in his Nyaya-sutras (Vide 1. 2. 45) explicitly laid down five modes of the Middle Term fallacy. These are :—1. The Savyabhichara. This is the same as the Doubtful. 2. The Viruddha—or the Contradictory. 3. The Prakaranasama. This fallacy arises where the reason is such that an argument similar to it would lead to an opposite conclusion. 4. The Sadhyasama. This fallacy is the same as the Asiddha or unproved. 5. The Kalatyayapadishta. This fallacy refers to a Hetu which is contradicted

on other occasions. B. Sankhyabhasa :—Pramanas according to the Jainas are two in number, Pratyaksha and Paroksha—and any account giving their number as more or less than two would be based on Sankhyabhasa. C. Bishyabhasa :—According to the Jainas, the Bishya or the object of Knowledge is many-sided *i.e.*, has many aspects all of which should be properly taken account of. Accordingly, if any one emphasises one of these aspects, ignoring the others altogether he will be committing the fallacy of the Bishayabhasa. D. Phalabhasa :—The fruit of Knowledge is the subsidence of Ignorance. The question arises—What is the exact relationship between Knowledge and its fruit? According to Vadideva “In some respect, the fruit is separate from Knowledge and in some respect it is identical with it; otherwise, they could not be looked upon as knowledge and its fruit.” Any view opposed to this Jaina position would be Phalabhasa. Thus the Nyaya theory that the fruit of Knowledge is different from Knowledge itself and the Buddhist position that Knowledge and its fruit, are identical are erroneous doctrines.

13. Naya.

Literally, Naya means 'a way.' In the Jaina system of thought, the word, however, has a technical meaning and means 'analytical knowledge' or 'knowledge of particularity,' as distinguished from the Pramana which is 'synthetic knowledge.' If the Pramana consists in aggregation and generalisation, the Naya consists in specification and division. If the object of the former is a thing or phenomenon or idea in its unity and totality, that of the latter would be that in its multiplicity and individuality. It seems, the Pramana attaches, the Naya detaches.

The Jaina writers true to their doctrine of the Syadvada are fond of asserting that the Pramana and the Naya are neither absolutely similar to nor absolutely different from each other. The Pramana and the Naya are related as the Sea and a part of the Sea which are neither identical with nor absolutely different from each other. The analytical and the synthetical characters of the Naya and the Pramana may be illustrated by a reference to the interpretation of a judgment. Let us have the Judgment, A is B and let us suppose that A has the aspects or qualities of B, C, D and E. The question is, What does the Judgment 'A is B' signify? The Jaina thinkers say that the Judgment is either (i) Sakaladesa-Svabhava or

(ii) Vikaladesa-svabhava. The former view is the standpoint of the Pramana and is based on a synthetic conception of A. The latter consists in an analytic conception of A and is the position of Naya. According to the former position, the Judgment A is B implies that A is to be taken here as a unitary totality of its modes, B, C, D and E and that the modes C, D and E are related to A in the same manner as B. According to the latter position, on the contrary our attention is to be principally directed to the nature of B in the Judgment A is B and A is to be considered in light of B only; here C, D and E cannot be regarded as attributes of A in the same way and with the same significance as B is an attribute of it. It thus appears that Pramana and Naya are complementary to each other, each beginning where the other ends and each being supplemented by the other.

The Naya studies the Viscsha or the aspect of particularity. The Viseshas, however, have been divided into two broad classes, the Guna and the Paryaya by the Jainas. "The Guna," says Vadi-deva, "is a quality which is connatural (with a thing) e.g., the actuality of Knowledge, the potentiality of Knowledge etc., etc., are the Gunas in the Soul." This description of the Guna is accepted by the Vaiseshika philosophers also, according to whom, "Qualities abide

in substances and are themselves without qualities and activities" (85, Bhasha-Parichcheda; Vide also I. 1. 16 Vaiseshika-Sutras). "Paryaya" according to Vadi-deva, "is an evolving Mode e.g., Pleasure, Pain etc., etc., are the Paryayas in that (i.e., in the Soul)." It may be observed, in passing, that the Vaiseshika conception of Karma (I. 1. 17 Vaiseshika-Sutra) is somewhat akin to the Jaina doctrine of Paryaya. The difference between the Gunas and the Paryayas seems to be that whereas the former are inherent in the nature of a substance and are permanent in some sense, the latter are evanescent phenomena rising from it. The Gunas and the Paryayas are thus the 'Attributes' and the 'Modes' of the Cartisians respectively.

As regards the relationship between the Substance, the Attribute and the Mode, the Vaiseshikas contend that (1) the Guna and the Karma are unrelated and distinct from each other and (2) that the Dravya again is distinct from both of them. The Jaina philosophers object to the contention of the 'Vaiseshika thinkers by pointing out that the Dravya does manifest itself in the Guna and the Paryaya and that otherwise it cannot be called their support. This leads the Jainas to reject the other contention of the Vaiseshikas that the Attribute and the Mode are absolutely distinct from each other. The Jaina conclusion is that the Guna and the

Paryaya are in some respects distinct from each other in as much as the former is inherent in the nature of the Dravya and the latter is Dravya in its evolving aspect ; but that in some respect again they are identical in as much as they are the aspects of one and the same reality.

The Nayas are classified into (1) the Dravyarthika Nayas and (2) the Paryayarthika Nayas. The former are so called because they deal with the Dravya or abstract reality. The latter, on the contrary, deal with the Paryayas or the particular aspects of reality.

14. Dravyarthika Naya.

The Dravyarthika Naya has three modes—the Naigama, the Samgraha and the Vyavahara. (1) The Naigama or the non-distinguished is so called because it takes two ideas in a lump, as it were. It leaves out of consideration, for the time being, the differences between the two ideas and gives a unitary idea of the two by subordinating the one to the other. The Naigama again may be of three modes, described and illustrated as follows :—(i) In the Soul, Consciousness is Existent. Here the Naigama subordinates the attribute 'Existence' to the attribute 'Consciousness.'

(ii) An Object is a Substance modified. Here, Naigama subordinates the idea of the entity 'Substance modified' to that of the entity 'Object.' (iii) A Worldly minded man has momentary Happiness. Here the Naigama subordinates the attribute 'momentary Happiness' to the idea of the substance 'a Worldly minded man.'

The Naigama should not be mistaken for the Pramana. With the Pramana, the two ideas are independent of and irreducible to each other. The Naigama, on the contrary, detaches one of the ideas, gives prominence to it and by subordinating to it, the other idea, obliterates their difference and isolation.

The Naigama gives what is called, Definition in European logic. Thus in (i) above, the Naigama may be said to supply a 'genetic definition' of Consciousness. Consciousness, as Descartes' "Cogito Ergo Sum" shows, cannot generate and operate unless Existence is postulated. In (ii) the Naigama is exactly the definition 'per genus et differentiam.' 'Substance' is the genus, the fact of its modification is the differentiam and the two together may be said to define the 'Object.' The (iii) above embodies all forms of ordinary and practical definition,—'descriptions' as we call them.

(2) The Samgraha. This Naya carries the process of analysis and differentiation a step further and

detaches the aspect of generality for special consideration. As the Samanya or generality may be either Para or Supreme or Apra or lesser,—the Samgraha is either Para-Samgraha or Apra-Samgraha. "The Para-Samgraha," says Vadi-deva, "consists in neglecting the innumerable particulars and attending exclusively to the Pure Essence, equivalent to abstract Existence." The Apra-Samgraha, again, consists in attending to the lesser generalities e.g., Substantiality etc., and neglecting their modes.

3. The Vyavahara Naya is the exact opposite of the Samgraha. "The Vyavahara Naya," as Vinaya Vijaya says, "takes into consideration an object as possessing specific properties only." The logical process of Division is really dependent on this Vyavahara Naya. It supplies the principle of individuation,—the fundamentum divisionis, as it is called in European logic and finds out varieties in what is represented as a homogeneity by the Samgraha. The following statements of Vadi-deva will prove what we say. "The Vyavahara is the process which specifies in a regular order, the objects, revealed by the Samgraha. As for example,—What is Existent is either a Substance or a Mode."

15. Paryayarthika Naya.

The Jaina philosophy as we noted already, is characterised by an extremely practical tone. This practical tendency is most conspicuous in its doctrines of the Syadvada and of the Naya. The Dravyarthika Nayas are undoubtedly of much practical importance, dealing as they do, with the detached aspects of Substantiality. But it is in the Paryayarthika Nayas that the extremely practical temperament of the Jaina philosophers finds its emphatic utterance. These forms of Naya refuse to consider a thing except as what it is actually at the present moment.

The Paryayarthika Naya is Naya par excellence and is of four modes.

1. The Rijusutra—It is so called because it deals with expressions of what is straight or manifest. The states or modes of a thing, as it existed in the past and as it will exist in the future, are not so clear to us as its present condition. These are 'crooked' phenomena to us and the present aspect of the thing only may be said to be "straight." The Riju Sutra Naya describes this present mode of a thing.

2. The Sabda.—"The Sabda Naya," says Vinaya Vijaya, "treats synonymous words as all having the same sense." It seems that with the Sabda Naya we enter into a new realm,—a realm not of things, as with

the Naigama, the Samgraha, the Vyavahara and the Riju-sutra—but a realm of nomenclature and terminology. With the four kinds of Nayas already discussed, the question was, What is the most important aspect of a thing? The question, however, with the Sabda, the Samabhirudha and the Evambhuta Nayas seems to be, What is, or should be the meaning of a word? Accordingly, instead of classifying the Nayas into the Dravyarthika and the Paryayarthika Nayas,—which classification we have chosen to adopt,—some have brought the former four Nayas under the class of the Artha-Naya or the Naya dealing with objects and the latter three under the Sabda-Naya or the Naya dealing with words.

Yet it is possible to trace the way in which the Sabda carries the work of differentiation a step further than the Riju-Sutra. The latter expressly confined itself to the consideration of the present mode of a thing; it however, chose to reserve all opinions about the past and the future natures of a thing. But what does Sabda Naya do? "It gives," says Vadi-deval "different meanings to a sound (i.e., a word) in accordance with the difference in time, etc." Following Vadi-deva, we may say that while Riju-Sutra confines itself to the consideration of the present and the actual mode of a thing, the Sabda goes a step further and

differentiates the present from the past and the future,—the actual from the potential and the possible.

3. The Samabhirudha—This Naya attaches different meanings to synonyms even, because of their differences in derivations. The Samabhirudha thus goes further than the Sabda in approaching particularity. According to the Sabda, 'Indra' and 'Sakra' mean the same Being,—the Lord of the immortal Beings. But the Samabhirudha goes nearer to exactitude by pointing out that the words do not mean the same Being,—the former, referring to 'one who is rich' and the latter, to 'one who is able.'

4. The Evambhuta—This Naya limits the meaning of a word as closely as possible. "Evambhuta Naya," says Vinaya Vijaya, "Verily recognises an object denoted by a word, only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function (as suggested by the Derivative meaning of the word)." In other words, the Evambhuta Naya would call 'Indra' by 'Indra' only when he is rich and 'Sakra,' only when he is able. As soon as his richness or his strength goes, he would be deprived of these names.

It is thus that a study of the nature of the Nayas gives us the principle of modern European logic that the intension of a term increasing its extension decreases

and vice versa. "Each succeeding standpoint," as Vinaya Vijaya says "of these seven Nayas is purer than the preceding one." This is excellently expressed by Vadi-deva in the following words :—

"Because the Naigama consists in the revelation of both the Existent and the Non-existent its range is wider than that of the Samgraha which considers the Existent only. The Samgraha again considers all the Existent things ; hence it has a wider range than the Vyavahara which considers only a mode of existence. The Vyavahara which has for its objects the phenomena of all the three times is of wider application than the Riju-Sutra which considers only the present phenomena. The Sabda differentiates (the aspects of) objects in accordance with the differences in time etc., but the Riju-Sutra does not do so ; hence the latter has a wider extension than the former. The Samabhirudha prefers to distinguish the meanings of synonyms ; the Sabda, however, does rather the opposite and is accordingly wider in range than the former. The Evambhuta again distinguishes objects in accordance with the differences in their activity ; the Samabhirudha does the contrary and has accordingly more objects in view than the Evambhuta."

16. Nayabhasa.

"The Nayabhasa," says Vadi-deva "consists in denying the reality of aspects other than that in which one is interested."

1. The Naigamabhasa :—If instead of subordinating one idea to the other, the two ideas are held to be absolutely separated from each other, there will be an instance of Naigamabhasa. The Jaina philosophers accuse the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika systems of committing this fallacy in as much as they hold that the general and the particular aspects of a thing are absolutely sundered from each other.

2. (a) The Para-Samgrahabhasa :—The fallacy with regard to the Para-Samgraha would consist in denying the reality of the particular things of the world. The Jainas charge the supporters of the Advaita, *i.e.*, non-duality with the commission of this fallacy because they refuse to admit any reality other than the Brahman. The philosophers of the Sankhya school also are accused by the Jainas of this fallacy, as they recognise the Prakriti as the one Cosmic Principle.

(b) The Aparā-Samgrahabhasa :—While in attending to the lesser generalities, if one goes further and denies the reality of their modes, he would be committing this fallacy.

3. The Vyavaharabhasa :—The fallacy with regard to the Vyavahara would be to give independence to the varieties and deny the reality of the Genus. According to the Jaina philosophers, the Charvaka sophists commit the Vyavaharabhasa.

4. The Riju-Sutrabhasa :—It consists in maintaining that the present aspect of the thing is the only reality and that there is no permanent substance underlying the evanescent phenomena of the moments. The Jainas think that the Buddhist philosophy involves this fallacy.

5. The Sabdabhasa :—While maintaining that the past mode of a thing is different from its present and future modes, if one contends that the substance underlying the modes is different in each case, he would be committing this fallacy.

6. The Samabhirudhabhasa :—The Samabhirudhabhasa consists in holding that all words which are etymologically different must necessarily mean not only distinct aspects of an object but stand for distinct objects themselves.

7. The Evambhutabhasa :—This fallacy is committed if it is seriously maintained that a thing should have one name when it is active and a different one when it is passive.

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